Abstract
How do drafters leverage public input during constitutional negotiations? I argue that public consultation is a strategic tool elites use to build consensus for preferred outcomes by selectively referencing supportive input—a practice I call cherry-picking. This reflects a core dilemma in modern constitution-making: the gap between citizen participation and elite control. While existing research focuses on consultation’s downstream effects, I examine its rhetorical use during elite deliberations. Using n-gram and semantic similarity tools, I analyze plenary transcripts from Chile’s (2021–22) and Cuba’s (2018–19) constitution-making processes. In Chile, newcomer elites used consultation to legitimize a break from the status quo. In Cuba, the ruling coalition leveraged it to consolidate authority and project consensus. Across regime types, elites exploit public input to marginalize dissent and frame decisions as popular will. I show that consultation often serves partisan ends by selectively elevating voices that affirm elite agendas.